Let The People Choose: Why Filtering DCEs Through The President Betrays Decentralization

The government’s latest proposal on the Constitution Review Committee work on the election of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) sounds like progress until you read the small print.

After 33 years of presidential appointment under Article 243(1) – where the President appoints, and a two-thirds majority of assembly members approve – the Cabinet has finally agreed that MMDCEs should be elected. This is what Ghanaians have demanded since 1992.

But the proposal being floated – that the President will nominate candidates for citizens to vote on – is not reform. It is repackaging. It replaces appointment with controlled selection. If the debate is about whether the President should still limit who qualifies to lead us locally, then it goes to the very heart of our governance failure.

What the Constitution Actually Says

The foundation of our local government system is not Article 243. It is Article 240.

Article 240(1): “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralized.”

Article 240(2)(e): “to ensure the accountability of local government authorities, people in particular local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance.”

How do we ensure accountability to the people when the President determines who is eligible to be voted for? How do we “participate effectively” when our participation is limited to choosing from a shortlist curated in Jubilee House?

Prof. H. Kwasi Prempeh’s Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) got this right in its December 2025 report: it recommended amending Article 243 to allow MMDCEs to be elected by the people rather than appointed by the President, to strengthen accountability, responsiveness and grassroots democracy.

The logic is simple: you cannot be accountable to two masters. The current DCE looks to Accra for validation, not to his district for direction.

The Two Cancers of Over-Centralization

This presidential filter creates two predictable problems:

1. No Accountability: The DCE remains beholden to the appointing authority, not the community. Article 243(3)(b) says the President can remove the DCE at will. Even if we add a vote, if he nominated you, you owe him your loyalty. As local governance scholar Prof. Joseph Ayee has long argued, Ghana practices decentralization in form but centralization in substance – we deconcentrate officers, we don’t devolve power.

When a DCE knows his next nomination depends on pleasing the party in Accra, he will fix the party office before he fixes the market.

2. No Development: Local development becomes a political reward, not a right. The District Assemblies Common Fund delays, the award of contracts from the capital, the choreography of sod-cutting – all become tools of presidential patronage. Our districts have not developed because their leaders are looking to Accra for instructions instead of looking to their own people for needs.

Prof. Kwamena Ahwoi, architect of Ghana’s decentralization, warned: “Decentralization is not about bringing government closer to the people; it is about bringing the people into government.” A presidential shortlist does the former. Only direct election does the latter.

The Real Cure for Winner-Takes-All

Here is the argument we have refused to have honestly: electing DCEs freely, with political parties and independent candidates competing openly, is the most practical cure for winner-takes-all politics.

Today, winning the presidential election means capturing all 261 districts. The President appoints all 261 DCEs. That is absolute power. That is why elections are do-or-die.

Now imagine a different Ghana:

In Shama, an independent candidate with a strong fisheries development plan wins. In Cape Cpast, the NDC wins the MCE seat though NPP won the presidency. In Ellembelle, a CPP candidate returns. In Old Tafo, a Movement for Change candidate wins on a sanitation agenda.

Suddenly, political power is spread. The presidential winner does not capture all power. Other parties and independents also control districts and can show what they can do. Local elections become a training ground for national leadership and a check on presidential excess.

This is not theory. It is how functioning decentralized democracies work.

Kenya: Since the March 4, 2013 general elections, uner its 2010 constitution, Kenyans directly elect 47 county governors on partisan tickets. An ODM governor can govern Kisumu even when a UDA President is in State House Nairobi. Competition spread. Local innovation flourished.

Nigeria: Despite its imperfections, its 774 Local Government Areas have democratically elected chairmen who contest under party banners. The local becomes a site of genuine political contestation.

South Africa: Municipal councils and mayors are elected on a partisan basis under a mixed system. The Democratic Alliance governs Cape Town, with Geordin Hill-Lewis as the city’s executive mayor, while the ANC governs nationally. That cohabitation forces negotiation, not domination.

United Kingdom & United States: The Mayor of London, Manchester, or Accra’s sister city – New York – does not need to be nominated by the Prime Minister or President. Sadiq Khan can be Labour while the Prime Minister is Conservative at a point in time. We have seen Zohran M<amdani elected as mayor of New York City, even with Donalds Trump as US president. That is pluralism.

Why is Ghana afraid of its own pluralism at the local level? Why do we insist that Article 55(3) – which bars partisan local elections – must be preserved? The Constitution Review Committee recommendation of non-partisan elections is understandable, but non-partisan should mean parties don’t sponsor, not that citizens can’t have full choice. If we must keep it non-partisan for now, let at least every citizen who qualifies be able to file, campaign as an individual, and be voted for – not a presidential pre-selection.

The old white paper proposal where the President appoints five, the Public Services Commission vets for competence, and three contest publicly was rejected by Ghanaians for good reason. It treats citizens as children who cannot be trusted to assess competence themselves.

Let the People Decide

The government’s stated plan to have a bill before Parliament before the end of 2026 and hold elections between 2026-2029 is commendable. But we must get the substance right.

We must complete the decentralization project we started in 1988. Completing it means:

• Direct election without presidential filter.
• Any qualified Ghanaian can file.

Open contest. Allow both independent candidates and political party candidates to contest. This ends winner-takes-all and allows opposition parties to control districts and prove their mettle. This is how you deepen multi-party democracy.

Fiscal devolution. Follow Article 240(2)(c) – a sound financial base with adequate and reliable sources of revenue. Without control over resources, an elected DCE is just an elected beggar.

Security of tenure. A DCE must be removable by the people through a vote of no confidence, not by a letter from the Presidency.

If we truly believe, as Article 240(2)(e) says, that local authorities must be accountable to the people, then the people must be the ones who hire them and the ones who fire them.

Do not give us half-freedom. Do not let Accra continue to choose for us.

Let the people choose. Let the people decide.

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