Negotiation and Management of Public Agreements: Our National Achilles Heel?” – Prof Akilakpa Sawyer

I should begin by thanking the Chancellor and the Council of the University of Cape Coast for giving me the privilege of joining in doing honour to Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah by giving the 12^th Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Lectures.

It is my understanding that, while these lectures are meant to honour his memory, they need not be about Kwame Nkrumah himself. On that understanding, I have chosen for these Lectures a theme – “Negotiation and Management of Public Agreements: Our National Achilles Heel?” – that is not directly about the life of Kwame Nkrumah. It, nevertheless, covers a matter of great concern to anyone who takes seriously Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of an independent Ghana, a strong Africa, managing our affairs autonomously and effectively in the interest of all our people.

As it happens, this theme is timely and of critical concern to all because public agreements, that is, agreements made by or on behalf of Government, play such a vital role in securing resources for development, the structuring and management of the national economy and society, as well as relations with the outside world. What agreements are made by the state and its agencies, their quality, and how well they are managed are, thus, critical to national development and our general well-being.

I shall, in the Lectures today and tomorrow, focus on international agreements, that is, agreements that Ghana makes with other states, or with foreign individuals or corporations. Using examples from recent practice, I propose to highlight some issues of process and of management of public agreements that I believe need fuller and more serious consideration than they have received so far. I conclude with some specific proposals which, with appropriate modifications and improvements, could help reduce the incidence of agreements through which we, so regularly, sell ourselves short.^[1]

Why do I consider the choice of this theme timely? Over the past year or so we have all noted the unceasing stream of controversy surrounding agreements made by Government or its agencies, attracting widespread suspicion and persistent allegations of fraud and corruption. The circumstances and terms of these agreements are often shrouded in secrecy, leading to often ill-informed public exchanges. I think we can all agree that the effect of all this is a generalised public perception that some, at least, of the agreements in question were

• unnecessary, or not in the public interest
• badly negotiated and/or managed, and
• tainted by fraud and corruption in one form or another.

Let me enter a caveat at this point. In these lectures, my principal concern is not so much whether particular challenges, suspicions/accusations of corruption, etc., are well-founded or not – though I have very clear personal positions in most of the instances discussed! My more limited purpose is to address

1. the persistence of a phenomenon that has been with us throughout the years of our Independence, irrespective of regime type or political party in control of government at any time, and
2. how we can help reduce the losses and remove the grounds for public anxiety by ensuring the effectiveness of how we (a) negotiate and (b) manage public agreements.

The starting premise of my arguments is that the critical factors for negotiating successful agreements include the following^[2]:

• a sound appreciation by representatives of the state, of what is required in any particular instance to advance state policy for the sustainable benefit of society, i.e., the demands of good national policy in the particular instance;
• a commitment by all state representatives involved to work diligently and exclusively in the public interest;
• thorough preparation as a basis for well-informed, competent and effective negotiation to get the best possible outcome for the country;
• effective oversight by the appropriate constitutional bodies and civil society; and
• transparency and an openness by government and public institutions to the citizenry about the rationale for, the processes, and the substance of public agreements.

Before proceeding to the substance of the Lectures, a second caveat is in order here: while I shall speak critically about the agreements I have selected for comment, I am the first to acknowledge the existence of countless soundly-negotiated public agreements, as well as knowledgeable, competent, and honest negotiators – in public service and in the private sector. Nothing I say here is intended to slight these agreements or their negotiators – indeed, I am sure the latter will agree with much of what I say and welcome my exposure of how they are underutilised and often thwarted by their superiors.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

With these introductory comments, I now turn to the substance of my presentation.

For this, I draw illustrative material from three public agreements, one each from:

• the natural resources sector – Gold Fields Ghana Ltd (Tarkwa & Abosso) Agreements (2016);
• the national security sector – Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States (2018); and
• the energy/power sector – The AMERI Agreement (2018).

1. GOLD FIELDS GHANA LTD (TARKWA & ABOSSO) DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS (2016)

The first illustrative case consists of two Development Agreements signed in March 2016 between the Republic of Ghana and two local subsidiaries of Gold Fields Ltd. of South Africa, namely, Gold Fields Ghana Ltd. (Tarkwa) and Abosso Gold Fields Ltd. (Damang).  Because the two agreements were negotiated and signed together, with fundamentally similar terms, we treat them as one for the purpose of these Lectures.

The Gold Fields agreements date back to the early 1990s when Gold Fields Ltd., a South African mining company, acquired the then State Gold Mining concessions at Tarkwa and Abosso. The original agreements were replaced in 2016 by the Development Agreements earlier mentioned, which gave to the Gold Fields companies, among other things, the special fiscal benefits provided for under the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703).

We highlight and comment on three striking features of the Agreements, namely, the unseemly haste with which the Agreements were concluded and rushed through ratification by Parliament; the nature and extent of the fiscal concessions given the companies, and some of the glaring technical flaws in the Agreements.

1. Rush to ratification

The Agreements were signed on 11 March, 2016, and tabled in Parliament on 16 March for ratification, as required by Art. 181 of the Constitution. That same day, the Full House referred the agreements to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Mines and Energy for consideration and reporting back, in accordance with the Standing Orders of Parliament. The Select Committee, in turn, reported back to the Full House the following day, 17 March. The House voted to proceed immediately with the motion, having waived the Standing Order requirement for a 48-hour wait between tabling and consideration of any motion to approve such a report. The report of the Select Committee was tabled for discussion at 9.30pm that day, and a motion to ratify the Agreements was passed at 9.40 pm – 10 minutes later!

Thus, two bulky agreements containing technical legal language and complex fiscal provisions were brought to Parliament 5 days after signature; tabled for discussion 1 day later; and it took the Full House 10 minutes to discuss the motion and vote to ratify the Agreements – a total of 6 days in all from signature by the parties to final Parliamentary ratification of two major agreements governing the exploitation of a key natural resource over the next decade!!

I can see no reason, and am not aware of any explanation, for this rush to ratification, especially in relation to mines already in operation.

More on this later.

2. Fiscal give-aways

The second feature of note relates to the extent of the fiscal concessions granted Gold Fields in the Agreements.

The rate of corporate income tax to be paid by Gold Fields was reduced from the existing 35% to 32.5%, and royalty from a fixed 5% to a range of between 3% and 5%, in addition to concessions on other items, such as import duty, the calculation of corporate income tax, etc. To get a sense of what these concessions signified, we refer to the estimation by representatives of Gold Fields, that the concessions would save the company USD33 million in tax year 2015 and USD26 million in tax year 2016!^[3] I need not remind anyone that, on the face of it, this saving by Gold Fields would constitute a loss to Ghana of USD59 million in tax foregone over a two-year period!

You might ask, what is the reason for such a concession to Gold Fields? The published official justification was that this and other concessions would bring in substantial new investments and help save the companies, which were in dire straits, threatening to lay off workers.^[4]

^[1] I wish to acknowledge with appreciation the contribution of Yao Graham, Tetteh Hormeku-Adjei, Kofi Date-Bah and my wife, Judith, who read drafts of the manuscript and offered constructive comment and advice.

^[2] There can be little doubt that corruption, abuse of office and lack of commitment to the public good account in large measure for the conclusion of so many major public agreements that go against the national interest. However, the exposure of corruption and abuse of office, and the campaign against them, deserving as they are of serious attention, are not the focus of these lectures. It is my firm belief, nevertheless, that the burden of my presentation and the implementation of the proposals that flow therefrom will make it easier to identify, expose and target these elements and strengthen the campaign against them.

^[3] Nick Holland, CEO of Gold Fields: https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Ghana-grants-Gold-Fields-tax-and-royalty-concessions-426935

^[4] https://thebftonline.com/archive/more.php?ID=18945. A further point was that these concessions gave Gold Fields no more than had been ‘granted’ to Newmont following the renegotiation of their agreements a year earlier: https://www.myjoyonline.com/business/2016/April-26th/finance-ministry-justifies-stability-agreement-with-goldfields-ghana.php. The weakness in this ‘equalisation’ argument is that Newmont was not ‘granted’ those concession as a result of the renegotiations. They already had all of them, and more, under an agreement concluded in 2003 within the terms of then governing law, the Minerals and Mining Act, 1986 (PNDCL 153).  The objective of the 2012-2014 renegotiations was to reduce those concessions to a minimum – which was largely achieved. Had the objective been to negotiate concessions for a new investment under Act 703 of 2006 – as was the case with the Gold Fields agreements of 2016 – the outcome would undoubtedly have been different.

Let us test the ‘dire straits’ assumption against the facts. For a start, the difficulties faced by Gold Fields, in common with other gold mining companies worldwide, were linked to a dip in the price of gold at the time (2013-16), a situation which, as can be seen from Fig.1, was to fluctuate upwards soon thereafter. Yet the fiscal concessions had been locked in for periods of 11 and 9 years, for Tarkwa and Damang, respectively!

Secondly, during the gold price boom years of 2009-13 (Fig. 1) that had preceded the dip in prices, the Gold Fields companies in Ghana had recorded rates of return on equity (ROE) far in excess of the rates recorded by the parent company, Gold Fields South Africa, as well as the industry average for most of the period! (Table 1). This implied that substantial surpluses must have been built up by Gold Field’s Ghana mines in the good times. Yet for most of that time, the combined amounts paid as mineral royalty, property rates, corporate tax and dividends to Ghana, stagnated at between 5% -7% of the realised value of the gold exported from the country, inching upwards only after the fixing of the royalty rate at a flat 5% in 2010.

Table 1              GOLDFIELDS GHANA LTD (TARKWA & DAMANG)

Overall, to put it charitably, had the Government negotiators done minimally competent research and background checks, they could not, in good faith, have made such concessions, certainly not for the reasons given.

3. Technical deficiencies

Apart from the hard-to-explain give-aways, there were technical deficiencies in the negotiating posture of Ghana’s negotiators that weakened the overall position of Ghana.

• In the first place, it is difficult to identify the statutory authority under which the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, the responsible Minister, purported to grant Gold Fields the fiscal concessions set out in the Agreements. The controlling statute, the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703), authorises the grant of such concessions in respect of proposed, i.e., new, investments (s. 49), not for helping mines in temporary difficulty (‘dire straits’!).
• Even in respect of new investments, which fall properly within S.48, there is no power to reduce the rates applicable to the investment under the law as it stands at the time of the agreement. The power of the Minister under s. 48 of Act 703 is limited to fixing the fiscal regime as it exists under the law applicable at the time of the grant, as a ceiling – so that, no change in the law after the conclusion of the agreement can impose on the investment any fiscal obligations higher than those in force at the time of the agreement.

Thus, both the classification of the ‘non-investment’ as falling within ss. 48 & 49, and the purported reduction of the rate of corporate tax from 35% to 32.5%, and of royalty from a flat 5% to a range of between 3% – 5%, would appear to have no basis in law!

In sum, apart from being difficult to justify, the grant of the indicated concessions in the Gold Fields Agreements exceeded the powers of the Minister under the relevant statute, were ultra vires, and are, therefore, of no legal effect!

• A third technical defect is the absence of any provision in the new Agreement binding Gold Fields to do anything whatsoever in return for the substantial concessions it received. If one ignores the vague references in the Preamble to Gold Fields’ intention to invest US$2.5 billion in Tarkwa, no term in the Agreements binds the company to invest even one dollar in the mine; nor to increase or even maintain jobs – NOTHING!!!

Not surprisingly, more than 2 years after the Agreements, which, as we have shown, provides special benefits for Gold Fields, locked in for up to 11 years, there is, today, little sign of any new investment, no increase in employment – on the contrary, more workers have been laid off since the conclusion of the Agreements – a number estimated at 1,500! Indeed, the company has adopted a policy of using contract labour, with the result that it has reduced its workforce, relying instead on outsourcing its labour requirements – workers are contracted for from others, as and when needed! This leaves many former employees of Gold Fields worse off than before the Agreements – the end of job security and loss of other rights and benefits!

What recourse for such workers? NOTHING – save protests, demonstrations and a failed court action!

For Government? NOTHING – no reference to, nor insistence on the supposed ‘understandings’ in the agreement about new investments and jobs!

What action? ENDORSEMENT – the new (2018) Minister of Lands and Natural Resources is reported to have proposed a Memorandum of Understanding, urging the workers to accept the lay-offs in return for certain assurances!!!^[1]

One might ask, is it conceivable that throughout the period, none of these issues caused any concerns for anyone in the Minerals Commission, the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, the Attorney-General’s Department, the Cabinet, Parliament – agencies entrusted with technical and policy oversight of such transactions, in the interest of and for the advancement of the national cause?

We cannot blame Gold Fields for taking advantage of the situation – their concern is to follow industry practice in reducing their costs, especially of labour and fiscal obligations, to the barest minimum for the benefit of their shareholders.

But what can we say about those who represented Ghana in this? Those who were either naïve or ignorant enough about industry trends to believe that the grant of concessions will lead to “more jobs”? Those who were so sloppy as to rely on off-the-record assurances of Gold Fields, and mere declarations of intention in the Preamble of the Agreements, in return for binding concessions on our part?^[2] Or, was there more than ignorance, sloppiness, or naiveté? More of corrupt pressure from higher levels of government, as is widely believed?

I now turn to the second illustration of weaknesses in the manner in which we conclude and manage public agreements – the Defence Cooperation Agreement^[3] between Ghana and the United States of America.

1. DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES

Background

In March 2018 Government submitted to Parliament for approval a security agreement it had signed with the United States of America, granting the US military forces specified rights within Ghana. The public revelation of this agreement was met by instantaneous and heated public discussion, protests and mass demonstrations.

The main issues in the public contestations were 

• Whether or not the agreement gave the US the right to establish a military base (or bases) in Ghana;
• Whether the agreement was a novelty in Ghana, as many suggested, or whether, as the Government maintained, it marked a continuation of a trend established decades earlier; and
• The desirability or otherwise of some of the specific provisions in the agreement, especially to do with diplomatic privileges for the US military, their families and even their civilian “contractors”.

As is common these days, the confrontations quickly took a party-political turn, with the leading Opposition Party, the National Democratic Party, staging a walk-out of Parliament ahead of consideration of the Agreement, and taking the lead in the public protests and demonstrations. Government, in response, accused the Opposition Party of hypocrisy as it had concluded similar agreements when in power! Not surprisingly, this partisan posturing by both opposition and government not only raised the level of acrimony and finger-pointing, but also lowered the quality of the public discussion.^[4]

Lost in much of the heated public confrontation were what, in my view, were the truly critical questions, namely,

• the strategic significance of the agreement at this time;
• the extensive concessions made to the US in the agreement; and
• the inept handling of the processing and, especially, communication by government.

It is on these three issues that I propose to focus my observations this evening. I must emphasise, at the start, that my comments are based on such documentation and information as have been available in the public sphere to date.

Turning first to the issues in contention in the public contestations, the following points seem clear from the record:

On the one hand

1. As maintained by Government throughout, the 2018 Agreement was not the first military cooperation agreement between Ghana and the US. There is a history of such agreements going back to at least 1972, the last one signed in 2015 by the government constituted by the current Opposition Party. Of course, in the nature of such matters, none of the previous agreements was made public, and so many in the current Opposition were unaware that their own party had signed such agreements when it was in power!
2. Again, it is the case that the agreement does not provide directly for the building of US of military bases in Ghana, as the Government insisted throughout the discussion. At the same time, however, the agreement permits US forces and contractors to “undertake construction activities on, and make alterations and improvements to, agreed facilities and areas”. It also gives US forces access to and use of facilities, in some instances to the exclusion of even the Ghanaian authorities, for storage of materiel, and as staging posts for the deployment of forces.

On the other hand,

• As will be demonstrated shortly, there can be little doubt that what was envisaged – certainly by the US – was the establishment of a base for the deployment and use of US military force in the West Africa Region – as part of a global projection of US power. This is a posture that goes far beyond anything contemplated or provided for in any of the previous agreements – hence the self-description of this agreement as an “enhanced partnership”.

Let us now turn to two issues that drew little public attention, yet which should give cause for genuine concern: the nature and level of risk assumed by Ghana, and the excessive concessions made to the US forces on Ghanaian soil.

2. The 2018 agreement described itself as a “framework for enhanced partnership and security cooperation” (Art. 2.1), going beyond all previous agreements in its coverage and intent, as previously stated. It provided, among other things, for the

• prepositioning and storage of US defence equipment, supplies and materiel;
• refuelling, landing and recovery of US aircraft; and
• staging and deployment of US forces and materiel.

The question arises, what is the strategic context of the new agreement? What are the interests of the US in the West Africa region?

The first point of note is the extension to the West African sub-Region, in the last few years, of the so-called “global war on terrorism” – a spill-over from the debacle in Libya and other parts of the Sahel – with conflicts raging in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and, indeed, Nigeria. The US and France, in particular, are actively engaged in these conflicts as part of the effort to contain the spread, as they see it, of global terror in the Sahel and West Africa. Not surprisingly, the Minister’s Memorandum covering the submission of the Agreement to Parliament referred to cooperation in “the conduct of joint operations to combat the threat of terrorism and other challenges in the West African region”.^[5]

A second, less obvious factor is the overarching concern of the US to secure and protect American interests in the substantial oil and gas fields in Ghana and the Gulf of Guinea generally.

On both counts, from the US point of view, the reach of US military power in the sub-Region needs to be assured. With the increasing unpopularity and relative inefficiency of large military bases in such places as Africa, a new approach, referred to as the “Lily Pad” strategy, is reported to have emerged. In the words of one commentator^[6], 

“Such lily-pad bases have become a critical part of an evolving Washington military strategy aimed at maintaining U.S. global dominance by doing far more with less in an increasingly competitive, ever more multi-polar world.”

With specific reference to Africa, he goes on:

“Without the freedom to create new large bases in Africa, the Pentagon is using S­ão Tomé and a growing collection of other lily pads on the continent in an attempt to control another crucial oil-rich region.”

“In Africa, the Pentagon has quietly created “about a dozen air bases” for drones and surveillance since 2007. . . [and] investigated building bases in Algeria, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria, among other places.” (Emphasis supplied)

Would it be too much to suppose that the 2015 agreement was “enhanced” in 2018 precisely to fit Ghana into a new role within this emergent US military strategy?

Did the Minister of Defence, his advisors, the Defence establishment and the political leadership fully understand and appreciate this, if only as a possibility? Did anybody weigh the risks of being a staging post/jumping-off base (however described) in US power projection – a lily pad – which would make Ghana a legitimate pre-emptive/reprisal target for those targeted by the US as “terrorists” in the Region? Did we consider this as a risk? If so, what price did we put on it?

Comments made by government representatives on this issue give very little ground for comfort! For instance, the Minister of Defence, the sector Minister in this case, is reported to have said^[7]:

“I want to state very clearly that the US are not building a base. They have asked to use some of our facilities at the Airport. Full stop”.

 “We should be grateful to the American government for spending their hard earned resources to come and upgrade our soldiers^[8] . . .”

Really? Use some of our facilities to preposition and store defence equipment and materiel; refuel, land and recover combat aircraft; stage and deploy forces and materiel for strikes in the region; conduct joint operations to combat the threat of terrorism – and they are doing Ghana a favour, for which we should be grateful?

How about the elementary principle of negotiation: know and understand your opponent’s interests & positions?

1. A second issue relates to the concessions made to the US in the Agreement. One might well ask, even as a Lily Pad, need Ghana have made so many concessions in the agreement, concessions that could not be considered essential to military cooperation with the US? Included in the list are the following:

• The US is under no obligation to disclose the nature, type and quantity of weapons or ammunition brought into the country, nor does Ghana have any right to inspect their stores or storage areas.

This leaves the US free to bring in, store, use and remove anything it chooses to bring in, at any time while the agreement is in force, with the right of sovereign Ghana limited to: “From time to time, representatives of the Executive Agents [i.e., Ghana and US] shall conduct joint inspections of agreed facilities and areas”!

• US personnel – officials, troops and contractors – do not need to obtain visas for entry into Ghana – their US ID cards (in the case of military personnel) or passports (in the case of civilian personnel) are enough. Moreover, they are entitled to diplomatic privileges – even in the case of US “contractors” – shades of Halliburton and Blackwater in the Iraq war disaster!
• Claims by Ghanaian citizens or residents for damage or loss caused by US military or civilian personnel are to be “resolved by the United States Government in accordance with United States laws and regulations”.

The overall effect of the terms of the Agreement is to render the presence, conduct and operations of US forces and civilian contractors within Ghana essentially extra-territorial, that is, free from security or any other oversight by Sovereign Ghana. Their acts, within Ghana, are beyond the reach of the laws of Ghana – even in respect of private activities of US civilian “contractors” affecting private citizens or residents of Ghana! Thus, where, say, the husband or wife of a US civilian “contractor” accidentally runs down your son, any civil claim you make is to be “resolved by the United States Government in accordance with United States laws and regulations”.

That this extent of surrender of sovereignty is not necessary for a military cooperation agreement, can be seen from a quick look at the Kenya/United Kingdom agreement, signed 2015, and in force 2016 – two years before the 2018 Ghana/US agreement.

Under the Kenya agreement,

• the UK is required to furnish in advance full details of all cargo and the number and types of weapons, ammunition, explosives, major equipment, etc., to be brought into Kenya;
• all such cargo was subject to inspection and verification by Kenya authorities on arrival;
• the UK is required to furnish a list of all personnel it intends to bring into Kenya under the agreement;
• each member of UK Forces must obtain and pay for an entry visa before arrival;
• Kenya has the power to prohibit the importation of any UK military stores or entry of any UK personnel under the agreement;
• UK Force members are subject to the criminal law of Kenya at all times (except for acts in course of official duty); and
• Kenya has jurisdiction over all civil claims and liabilities arising from activities of UK personnel within Kenya.

All these provisions, which reflect the normal attributes of national sovereignty, are absent from the Ghana/US agreement!

Unless I am missing something basic, this would suggest that Ghana offered no push-back to US demands! Which raises the further question: was there any proper negotiation of the terms of the agreement or did Ghana just sign on to a US template?

Part of the answer can, perhaps, be found in this incredible statement by the Minister of Defence, in addition to the others already referred to:

“We have already signed a 1998 agreement, we have signed the 2015 agreement and we have already caught ourselves in this net and we cannot back out because this is just a combination of the two agreements”. ^[9]

Need one say more?

This brings my presentation for today to a close.

Tomorrow, I shall review one more agreement – this time, from the energy/power sector – before setting out my in my concluding remarks and a set of proposals for addressing some of the issues I will have raised over the course of the two Lectures.

^[1] http://www.mining.com/ghanaian-government-wants-mediate-gold-fields-workers/

^[2] The naiveté of government’s defence of the agreement as put out by the then Minister of Lands and Natural Resources (https://thebftonline.com/archive/more.php?ID=18945), beggars belief!

^[3] Full title: “Agreement Between The Government of the United States of America And The Government of the Republic of Ghana On Defence Cooperation, The status of United States Forces, and Access to and use of agreed facilities and areas In the Republic of Ghana”

^[4] Unfortunately, this finger-pointing was reflected in parts of a speech to the nation delivered by the President of the Republic a month after the disclosure of the agreement, ignoring a situation of genuine public anxiety about the agreement: https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Full-Speech-Akufo-Addo-s-address-on-the-US-Ghana-Military-Co-operation-Agreement-640739

^[5] PARLIAMENTARY MEMORANDUM BY HON. MINISTER OF DEFENCE ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA ON DEFENCE COOPOERATION, THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES FORCES, AND ACCESS TO AND USE OF AGREED FACILITIES AND AREAS IN THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, March 2018. (Para. 4).

^[6] David Vine, “The Lily-Pad Strategy”, July 16, 2012: http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175568/

^[7] [https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana-US-agreement-Thank-American-government-Nitiwul-636176]

^[8] This is likely a reference to the $20 million that the US is reported to have voted to support training and equipping of the Ghana armed forces.

^[9] https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/We-cannot-back-out-of-US-mlitary-deal-Government-636672

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